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 Modeling Evolution in Theory
 and Practice
 Anya Plutynskitt
 University of Pennsylvania
 This paper uses a number of examples of diverse types and functions of models in
 evolutionary biology to argue that the demarcation between theory and practice, or
 "theory model" and "data model," is often difficult to make. It is shown how both
 mathematical and laboratory models function as plausibility arguments, existence
 proofs, and refutations in the investigation of questions about the pattern and process
 of evolutionary history. I consider the consequences of this for the semantic approach
 to theories and theory confirmation. The paper attempts to reconcile the insights of
 both critics and advocates of the semantic approach to theories.
 1. Introduction. In Laws and Symmetry, van Fraassen comments that phi-
 losophers of science have focused on the product of science, the theory,
 to the exclusion of the "aim, conditions, and processes of production"
 (1989, 189). This paper aims to fill this lacuna, especially with regard to
 evolutionary biology. In particular, I take a closer look at the use of mod-
 els in the practice of evolutionary biology. The product/process analogy
 assimilates science to industry, implying that the aim of science is the
 production of theories, and that a strict demarcation can be made between
 the product, theories, and the process, scientific practice. One of the aims
 of this paper is to challenge this strict demarcation. I argue that the diverse
 types and functions of models and modeling in biology are not easily
 categorized as either product or process. A further aim is to consider the
 consequences of blurring the line of demarcation between theory and prac-
 tice for the semantic approach to scientific theories.
 tSend requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of
 Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104; email: plutynski@earthlink.net.
 1I would like to thank Dr. Gary Hatfield, Dr. Paul Sniegowski, Dr. Warren Ewens,
 Dr. David Magnus, and an anonymous reviewer for commenting on earlier drafts of
 this paper.
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 The classic semantic view of van Fraassen (1980, 1989) characterizes
 theories as families of models. A theory is empirically adequate if the
 empirical substructures of one's "theory model" are isomorphic or struc-
 turally identical to one's "data model." So, confirmation is essentially fit
 between model and data. As I will demonstrate below, confirmation as
 identity of structure between theory and data model is inadequate to de-
 scribe the ways in which many models are deployed in evolutionary bi-
 ology. This paper thus follows the route of Downes (1992) and Griesemer
 (1990, 1991), who have each advocated a more "liberal" or "extended"
 semantic view of theories. They question whether isomorphism is the right
 way to conceive of the relation between theory and world, and whether
 the metamathematical sense of model adopted by the semantic view can
 serve as a template for all models in science.
 Beatty (1981), Lloyd (1988), and Thompson (1985, 1989) have each
 appropriated the semantic view as a way to describe the structure of evo-
 lutionary theory. They argue that it resolves many of the problems that
 arise for evolutionary theory on the received, or "syntactic" view. For
 instance, they claim that the criticism that evolutionary theory is not a
 scientific theory because of its alleged lack of laws is rendered moot by
 the semantic view. However, Ereshefsky (1991) and Sloep and van der
 Steen (1987) have argued that the semantic view faces some of the same
 difficulties as the received view. Ereshefsky argues that the semantic ap-
 proach cannot dispense with laws. Moreover, he points out that since
 evolutionary explanations often employ information from a number of
 subdisciplines within evolutionary biology, giving a formal account of
 their structure is forbiddingly complex, whether one adopts the semantic
 or the syntactic approach. In other words, the complex relation between
 theory and world is no less complex once one substitutes models and em-
 beddability requirements for axioms and partial interpretation rules. Like
 Ereshefsky, I am skeptical that a formal account of theory and confir-
 mation can be true to the practice of biology.
 In formal approaches to characterizing the structure and confirmation
 of theories, such as the semantic approach, the theory-world relation is a
 hierarchy, with theories as fixed entities, directing practice in a top-down
 fashion. Nancy Cartwright (1999) calls this the "vending machine" view
 of theories. By contrast, she suggests that the practice of model building
 is a creative act, and often independent of specific dictates of theory. Like-
 wise, Morgan and Morrison (1999) have argued that models in science
 may be autonomous agents and instruments of investigation. By this, I
 take them to mean that in the process of constructing and manipulating
 models, we can explore questions and discover novel empirical phenomena
 that are not derivable from or predicted by our best theories. I think that
 the views I've sketched here of Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison are
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 not incompatible with a more "liberal" semantic view of the sort advo-
 cated by Downes and Griesemer.
 This paper will thus go some way towards attempting to reconcile the
 insights of these critics and advocates of the semantic view. Evolutionary
 biologists are often attempting to answer historical questions. So, testing
 and deciding these questions often hinges on plausibility arguments and
 existence proofs. Mathematical and material models are deployed as ar-
 guments that some process or mechanism could be at work in nature.
 Brandon (1990) has summed up this issue by describing the sort of expla-
 nations often offered in evolutionary biology as "how possibly" expla-
 nations. "How actually" explanations are comparatively rare. He explains
 that biologists are often forced to settle for plausible scenarios, as opposed
 to exhaustive explanations, given the historical character of biology, as
 well as the complexity of ecological and biological systems. This point is
 close to the one I wish to make about models providing plausibility ar-
 guments. Often in evolutionary biology, it is more appropriate to speak
 of consilience of induction by appeal to several model-arguments, rather
 than confirmation via fit or isomorphism between models and world. In
 what follows, I will first discuss how I think that the picture of confir-
 mation offered by advocates of the semantic view might be elaborated
 upon to better reflect scientific practice, and second, how three different
 examples of modeling in biology serve as instruments of inquiry, existence-
 proof, and model-argument, respectively.
 2. On the Semantic Picture of Confirmation. E. Lloyd (1988) discusses three
 forms of confirmation: fit between some model and data, independent
 testing of some aspect of a model, and variety of evidence. Each of these
 types of confirmation, she argues, is a variant of the same general type:
 demonstration that a natural system is isomorphic in certain respects to a
 model. While I think that Lloyd's account is the best we have yet of how
 evolutionary hypotheses are confirmed, I wish to suggest the following
 emendations of her view.
 Isomorphism, while it may be an ideal relation between model and
 world, is often neither hoped for nor possible, in evolutionary biology.
 Lloyd mentions this point in a footnote (1988, 168), but I think that this
 issue calls for greater elaboration. Many models are simulations of natural
 systems. While one hopes to incorporate as much realism as possible in
 such cases, laboratory or computer simulations will necessarily be very
 different from natural systems. In fact, it is exactly when a process in
 nature is too complicated to track, or would take too long to observe, that
 such simulations are appropriate. Biologists do not expect such simula-
 tions to be isomorphic to natural systems. Rather, simulation models serve
 in both an exploratory and argumentative role. A simulation can yield
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 new empirical results, or suggest that one or another factor in the evolu-
 tionary process is more or less significant. I will discuss an elegant example
 below of a simulation of 20,000 generations of evolution using E. coli as
 an experimental system.
 Modeling in biology often has the role of demonstrating the plausibility
 of some process or mechanism. While Lloyd mentions this point in her
 discussion of Beckner, I believe that this important function of modeling
 in biology gets left to one side in her subsequent discussion. Sometimes,
 the question is not whether one can generate a model whose assumptions
 are well confirmed or whose results have a good fit with empirical data,
 but whether one can generate a model at all that is just robust enough to
 give us good reason to expect that some process could occur in nature.
 Success at constructing such a model can serve as an existence proof. Rice
 and Salt's (1988) model of speciation in sympatry is one example (see
 below).
 Lloyd devotes some discussion to the problem of counterfactual as-
 sumptions or idealizations-we are warned to be skeptical of models that
 employ such assumptions. I agree. However, I would argue that there are
 some cases where this skepticism ought to be suspended. There are an
 enormous number of factors at work in any evolutionary process. To
 incorporate all these factors in a model would quickly make our mathe-
 matics intractable. Counterfactual assumptions are thus par for the course
 in modeling evolutionary dynamics. Infinite population size, haploidy, or
 random mating, are often unavoidable, if counterfactual, assumptions one
 needs to make in order to answer specific evolutionary questions. Pro-
 ponents of the semantic view argue that models are abstract and often
 involve idealization. Theoretical hypotheses serve as an empirical inter-
 pretation of theoretical models, namely, that the model is isomorphic in
 some respect to the world. However, this brief story sidesteps one of the
 most interesting aspects of the interpretation and evaluation of models
 and modeling: which kind of idealizations are appropriate in which con-
 texts and why. While I cannot hope to provide an exhaustive answer to
 this question here, I'll suggest the following. The question of independent
 support for one or another assumption is sensitive to the kind of questions
 one is addressing. Moreover, there is a fundamental trade-off at work in
 deciding upon model assumptions: how much are you willing to sacrifice
 in explanatory detail in exchange for a general and tractable answer to
 some evolutionary question? The amount of risk one takes in ignoring
 complicating factors is directly proportional to the gain in degree of gen-
 erality of one's model. In some cases, assuming an infinite population size
 or random mating is appropriate; it depends both on the context and the
 risk one is willing to assume. This may seem counterintuitive: how can
 models serve as plausibility arguments when the assumptions of the model
 S228
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 are so implausible? For example, infinite population size is simply an im-
 possibility. Oughtn't we regard any model assuming this to be suspect?
 Certainly, counterfactual assumptions may give us reason to doubt the
 plausibility of a model argument. However, in many cases, models that
 are simply false can often be as effective, if not more effective, in furthering
 theory as those models that are true of or similar to the world are (Wimsatt
 1987). If we were to reject any model argument with counterfactual as-
 sumptions, then we would have to side with Pearson and Punnett in their
 initial rejection of Fisher's (1918) paper, where he argued for the compat-
 ibility of biometry and a gradualist picture of evolution with the principles
 of Mendelism. Counterfactual assumptions are not always reason to re-
 gard a model as suspect. In some cases, a model that employs counterfac-
 tual assumptions can serve as a compelling argument, either for or against
 the possibility of some relation, pattern, or process in nature. I will give
 an example below from a debate over the founder model of speciation.
 According to the classic semantic view, mathematical models are ab-
 stract representations of real systems. Laboratory experiments will serve
 to generate data models, which are then checked against one's theory
 model. This top-down picture takes mathematical models to be the core
 expression of theory, and laboratory models to be testing grounds for
 one's theoretical hypotheses. In the practice of science, this hierarchy is
 often reversed. Mathematical models often serve as tools for investigation;
 the investigative aspect of science is not confined to the lab or field. Math-
 ematical or computer simulation models can function as tests of theoreti-
 cal questions in the same way as do laboratory experiments. Moreover,
 there is an interesting division of labor in terms of the scope of question
 capable of being investigated in mathematical versus laboratory modeling.
 Mathematical models can serve to answer questions that cannot be ad-
 dressed in a laboratory model, and vice versa. In the examples discussed
 below, mathematical and material models serve as independent, comple-
 mentary lines of evidence in addressing questions about the pattern and
 process of evolution, rather than steps in a hierarchy between theory and
 world.
 3. Some Models of Models. Now I will consider three examples of modeling
 which illustrate the instrumental and argumentative role of diverse types
 of models in biology. J. Griesemer (1990) has recently brought attention
 to the role of material models in evolutionary biology. Richard Lenski
 conducted an experiment using E. coli to investigate the dynamics of evo-
 lution over many generations. E. coli have a generation time of about
 twenty minutes under optimal conditions, yielding many generations a
 day, and can be transferred into fresh medium and frozen at - 80°C with-
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 out damage. This makes them analogous to "machines for time travel"
 for the study of processes of evolutionary change (Lenski and Travisano
 1994). Lenski and Travisano describe such a system as follows:
 Imagine that you have discovered a well-preserved and clearly strat-
 ified fossil bed that provides a record of evolution extending thou-
 sands of generations for the particular organism that you study....
 Imagine that you could resurrect these organisms and reconstruct
 their environment exactly as it was during thousands of generations
 preserved in the fossil bed.... You could travel back in time and
 manipulate populations by altering their evolutionary history or their
 environment, and then return to the present to examine the effect of
 these conditions on the dynamics of adaptation and diversification.
 (1994, 6808-6809)
 Lenski and others have been conducting a long-term evolution experiment
 on twelve replicate populations of E. coli culture with frozen records of
 approximately 20,000 generations. Fitness (measured as the ratio of the
 number of doublings of derived vs. ancestor strains) of twelve replicate
 populations increased by approximately 45%, with most improvement
 taking place in the first 2000 generations. The trajectory of mean fitness
 for the twelve strains approximates an asymptotic curve, suggesting that
 there are constraints on indefinite improvement. The system allows one to
 investigate the dynamics of adaptation in populations, the relative signif-
 icance of stochastic factors, and other evolutionary questions, since each
 stage in the process is preserved. Lenski's simulation model is not simply
 an experiment which can confirm one or another hypothesis about evo-
 lutionary dynamics. He uses it as an investigative tool, i.e., as a source of
 new questions as well as answers about the evolutionary process. At 20,000
 generations, Lenski and his students are discovering new information
 about the dynamics of evolutionary change. In particular, several of the
 strains acquired a mutation, which caused them to have an elevated mu-
 tation rate. These strains can be put into competition with other strains, or
 manipulated using molecular techniques, to address questions about the
 evolution of mutation rates: Is there an upper or lower limit on the rate of
 mutation? What constrains that limit? In other words, Lenski's model is a
 fruitful source of new questions and potential experiments. Moreover,
 Lenski has used his system to argue that the divergence in relative fitness of
 strains (see Figure 1), all resulting from a common ancestor, suggests that
 drift plays a significant role in the evolutionary process.
 Another such material model is the 'speciation machine' constructed
 by Rice and Salt (1988; see Figure 2). Rice and Salt constructed a labo-
 ratory model similar to Lenski's which they claim demonstrates the effec-
 tiveness of speciation in sympatry, i.e., within an interbreeding population.
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 Figure 1. Lenski et al.'s (1994) trajectories of mean fitness relative to the ancestor in 12
 replicate populations of E. coli during 10,000 generations of evolution in the laboratory.
 Their long-term experiment was able to generate several reproductively
 isolated strains of Drosophila through sympatric means, via disruptive se-
 lection by habitat specialization. They constructed a habitat maze where
 Drosophila chose selective habitats that differed with respect to light, grav-
 ity, and choice of chemical vapors. Positive assortative mating evolved as
 a correlated response to the disruptively selective character, in this case,
 preference for different habitats within the maze. Key to this experiment
 is that selection alone was able to generate isolated strains. There were no
 population bottlenecks or isolation; each entire generation of flies from
 the several habitats were returned together to the beginning of the maze
 and allowed to choose their habitats.
 This is only one among many experiments with laboratory populations
 of Drosophila that have been used to investigate different hypotheses about
 speciation. There has been at least forty years of work on speciation in
 the lab. Drosophila are the organism of choice, and there have been tests
 of selective divergence, founder effect, and sympatry (for a review, see Rice
 and Hostert 1993). Rice and Salt's work challenges what has been the
 received view among evolutionary biologists, namely that geographical or
 spatial isolation is a crucial condition for speciation, and that directional
 selection alone cannot generate new species. The mainstream view for ap-
 proximately fifty years among evolutionary biologists is that speciation in
 allopatry (geographical isolation) is the major mode of speciation, and
 that founder effect (the isolation of a small subpopulation and reconsti-
 tution of the genetic architecture through drift) is one of the most common
 means of speciation. Rice and Salt's model serves as an argument to the
 contrary. Their laboratory model thus serves as an existence proof that
 speciation can occur in sympatry.
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 Figure 2. Rice and Salt's (1988) Drosophila habitat maze for speciation in sympatry. Po-
 sitions of the selective habitats are indicated by number (1-8).
 Several questions arise out of this material modeling of the speciation
 process. For example, how relevant are laboratory experiments to speci-
 ation in the wild? Some might question the relevance of Rice and Salt's
 experiment to natural speciation processes. Others claim that laboratory
 populations are fundamentally different from natural populations, and
 therefore laboratory experiments and breeding experiments are irrelevant
 to the problem of how new species arise. This argument is in the tradition
 of naturalists such as Jordon and Kellogg (1907), who claimed that no
 product of the botanical garden as a result of breeding experiments could
 count as a case of speciation.
 Additionally, how are we to evaluate the results of these speciation
 experiments? How isolated is 'reproductively isolated'? Must one show
 S232
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 complete reproductive incompatibility? Is lowered viability and fertility in
 attempted crossing sufficient? When are two organisms truly new species?
 Rice and Salt showed that their sympatry experiment yielded populations
 with lowered viability and assortative mating: Is this a speciation event?
 Clearly, inferences from the laboratory to the wild are not decisive.
 Laboratory work is not meant to reproduce all factors relevant in nature.
 Rather, one or several parameters-e.g., selection by habitat type, drift,
 etc.-can be tested either individually or in combination or competition
 with one another. Models such as Rice and Salt's are not decisive tests so
 much as supplementary lines of evidence. The standard top-down picture
 of theoretical models being confirmed by laboratory or fieldwork is not
 appropriate here. The theory of sympatry is not confirmed by identifying
 isomorphisms between the laboratory data and the theory model. Rather,
 the very fact that Rice and Salt were successful at constructing simulation
 of speciation in sympatry serves as an argument for its occurring in nature.
 In evolutionary biology, often simply demonstrating the possibility of
 some process in the lab is a persuasive case for its occurrence in nature.
 In this case, lowered viability in crosses of these lab strains is an argument
 for the possibility of sympatry in the wild.
 Multiple lines of evidence from multiple different subdisciplines within
 evolutionary biology bear on the question of how important, for instance,
 drift is in evolution, or which mode of speciation is possible or prevalent
 in nature. Evolutionary questions are almost never decided by single "cru-
 cial experiments." Biologists construct models such as Lenski's and Rice
 and Salt's not to prove the relative significance of one or another factor
 in the evolutionary process, but to provide a plausibility argument. In this
 sense, a laboratory experiment functions in the same way as some theo-
 retical or mathematical models in population genetics. Mathematical
 models can serve as arguments as well. Moreover, mathematical models
 can answer questions that laboratory models cannot.
 For example, another line of evidence on the role of founder effect in
 speciation is theoretical population genetic models. Two self-professed
 neo-Darwinians, Barton and Charlesworth (1984), devoted a review paper
 to theoretical objections to the founder model. They concluded that al-
 though founder effects may cause speciation, they are only a very rare
 extreme along a continuous range of possibilities. Complete geographic
 isolation is unnecessary, and selection can break up coadapted systems of
 alleles. In particular, they question the "genetic revolution" as a mecha-
 nism of speciation, and argue that speciation is more likely the result of
 small steps than a single founder event.
 While the theoretical arguments are too mathematically complex to
 reproduce here, Barton and Charlesworth show how under both single-
 and multi-locus models, reduction in variability induced by drift reduces
 the chances of peak shifts, i.e., the transition from one equilibrium under
 S233
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 selection to another. Selection requires variability to act upon. Loss of
 heterozygosity during a founder event reduces that variability. Mayr
 (1942, 1963, 1970) argued that reduction in population size was key to
 speciation, in that such a reduction would entail an exposure of new gene
 combinations because of a loss of heterozygosity. The resulting transfor-
 mation of the genetic composition of a population has been called a "ge-
 netic revolution." Barton and Charlesworth counter that the loss of het-
 erozygosity can occur only in populations that grow so slowly that they
 are more likely to die out than evolve into new species. They also explain
 that the probability of peak shifts-moving from one peak on Wright's
 adaptive landscape to another- decreases exponentially with the size of
 each step. In other words, the probability that a founder population will
 undergo a rapid transition to a new selective equilibrium is very low. Re-
 productive isolation is more likely to evolve in a series of small steps than
 in a single "genetic revolution." Their mathematical model serves as an
 argument against the founder effect, or more specifically, "genetic revo-
 lutions" playing a role in speciation.
 One might argue that the classic semantic view is still appropriate for
 these examples. For instance, the habitat maze is a structure that is true
 for, or satisfies, the sentences of the theory of sympatry. However, the
 usefulness of this metamathematical sense of model is stretched to the limit
 when it comes to describing how such models function in the practice of
 evolutionary biology. Models such as Rice and Salt's habitat maze, or
 Barton and Charlesworth's mathematical model of peak shifts, are not
 confirmations, nor are they theoretical models that await confirmation.
 The laboratory model is a caricature of what actually goes on in natural
 populations. Laboratory models such as Rice and Salt's function simul-
 taneously as a tool for investigation and a test of the plausibility of one
 mechanism of speciation. If sympatry were possible, how would it work?
 And, can we make it work? Barton and Charlesworth's model functions
 as an argument, not a theory that awaits testing in the lab or field. Multiple
 different types of models which jointly establish the plausibility of the
 same mechanism yield a consilience of induction in favor of its existence
 in nature. Confirmation in historical disciplines such as evolutionary bi-
 ology is rarely a matter of simply checking the fit between model and
 world. Because we can rarely see evolution in action, evolutionary biolo-
 gists use models as tools for investigation, existence proofs, and arguments
 for or against the plausibility of one or another mechanism at work in
 nature.
 4. Conclusion. Biologists more often than not resort to laboratory simu-
 lations and idealized mathematical models as sources of plausibility ar-
 guments. Moreover, models and modeling can have multiple, diverse func-
 S234
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 tions, which are not easily characterized as either theory making or
 confirmation. Models can yield new questions or empirical phenomena
 not predicted by theory, serve as existence proofs, or as arguments for or
 against the significance of one or another mechanism at work in nature.
 While the appropriation of formal semantics was a helpful way to get out
 of the rut of viewing theories as sets of axioms, the semantic view still
 carries the taint of the discovery-justification divide. In evolutionary bi-
 ology, discovery and justification, along with theory and practice, are not
 so easily demarcated. Models and modeling are not ancillary to theory,
 but can function as independent tools for investigation.
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